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Abstract. Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a 
“capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008, p. 462). 
However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility 
despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-
behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently 
irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the 
accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such a capacity, but only to be 
earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this 
willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity 
ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I 
do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a 
necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense. 
 
 
1. Williams on responsibility as a virtue 
 
When we call someone “irresponsible” this typically involves a negative 
kind of evaluation of their character, and when we criticize a person for 
being irresponsible in this sense we do not just criticize them for some 
specific bad thing that they have done, but rather we criticize their 
character. Naturally, we may be prompted to call someone “irresponsible” 
because of something that they have done or because of their general 
history of doing those sorts of things, however this only reveals our 
epistemic position – i.e. we come to know that someone is irresponsible by 
building up a picture of their history; a picture which, if sufficiently 
consistent, arguably reveals things about their character – but it does not 
show that when we criticize a person for being irresponsible we are only 
criticizing some specific act. On the other hand, when we call someone 
“responsible” in the sense which is opposite to the term “irresponsible,” 
this is a positive evaluation of their character – an accolade – and when we 
praise a person for being responsible in this sense we again do not just 
praise them for some specific good thing that they have done, but rather 
we praise their character. Garrath Williams suggests that when 
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“irresponsible” and “responsible” are used in this way, what we have in 
mind is “responsibility as a moral virtue” (2008, pp. 456, 457). 
Here are some character traits which Williams associates with people 
that have this virtue: (i) a person who has this virtue is reliable, (ii) she has 
commitment to- and carries through with projects once she has started 
them, (iii) she has initiative, (iv) she can exercise her own judgment, (v) 
she is trustworthy, (vi) she identifies with her actions and omissions, (vii) 
she can answer- or is accountable for her actions and omissions, (viii) she 
makes up for her actions and omissions, (ix) she is conscientious in 
discharging her responsibilities, (x) she recognizes and deals appropriately 
with her various and sometimes-conflicting responsibilities, (xi) she can 
judge whether others are fulfilling their responsibilities, (xii) she can judge 
who should hold whom responsible for their actions and omissions (2008, 
pp. 459-462), and (xiii) if appropriate she steps in when others neglect 
their responsibilities by reporting this to the relevant authorities so that 
appropriate measures can be taken, and maybe she even takes on those 
responsibilities herself if no one else can take those measures (2008, p. 
467).1 
Many of these character traits relate to the idea that a person who is 
responsible in this virtue sense will discharge their responsibilities2 — i.e. 
that they will see to it that the things that it is up to them to do get done. 
But since our responsibilities stem from a possibly wide range of different 
sources – for instance, although “[r]oles define and clarify [some 
normative] demands upon us, … the imperatives of basic human decency” 
impose their own distinctive normative demands upon us too (2008, p. 
467) – Williams therefore schematizes the virtue of responsibility with the 
suggestion that “responsibility represents the readiness to respond to a 
plurality of normative demands” (2008, pp. 459, 469). 
Much of what Williams says above about responsibility as a virtue 
strikes me as right; I take issue, however, with something else which he 
says: namely, his claim that in order to be responsible in the virtue sense a 
person must actually possess the capacity to respond in the appropriate 
way, as opposed to, for instance, merely having the right intentions and a 
history that testifies to such intentions. Williams writes that although when 
we talk of this virtue “we are also concerned with an agent’s will to 
employ his abilities” (i.e. whether they have the right intentions, or 
whether they are well-meaning), he insists that “responsible agents can, 
and must, judge for themselves,” and hence he argues that “an account of 
responsibility has to take seriously the capacity of responsible agents to 
                                                        
1 Similar characterizations of responsibility as a virtue are also offered by others 
(e.g. Haydon, 1978; Williams, 1995; Bovens, 1998; Duff, 1998, p. 291). 
2See Robert Goodin’s (1986; 1987) discussion of this use of the term 
“responsibilities.” 
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judge. [T]he responsible agent must appreciate and weigh these demands, 
and try as best she . . . can, to negotiate an appropriate response to them” 
(2008, p. 462, emphasis changed). However, merely trying does not seem 
to be enough for Williams to grant someone the accolade “a responsible 
person,” since he repeatedly describes this readiness in terms of capacity 
or ability: for instance, even in his concluding comments he talks of “an 
agent’s capacity to manifest responsibility,” and he says that “[t]o speak of 
‘responsible agents’ presupposes that those agents are able to judge” 
(2008, p. 469, emphasis added). 
The thought that people must not only be well-intentioned but that they 
must also possess Williams’ capacity in order to be truly responsible – i.e. 
that possession of this capacity is a condition of having this virtue – is 
attractive. However, at the same time I also think that there is something 
wrong about this idea. Thus, in §2 (immediately below) I first comment on 
what I think is right about it, but then in §3 I explain why I think that this 
suggestion should ultimately be rejected. On my account, pace Williams, 
to possess the virtue of responsibility a person needs only to be earnestly 
willing to do the right thing and to have a history which testifies to that 
willingness, but they need not actually possess Williams’ capacity. 
 
 
2. What’s right about Williams’ suggestion? 
 
Two things seem right about the suggestion that possession of Williams’ 
capacity is indeed a condition of being a truly responsible person in the 
virtue sense: firstly, we probably have good reason to want to be like that 
ourselves (i.e. to have that sort of capacity); and secondly, we also 
probably have good reason to prefer to associate ourselves with people 
who have that capacity rather than with those that do not. 
Here are some reasons why we might prefer to be the sorts of people 
who possess Williams’ capacity rather than to be the sorts of people who 
have a deficit in this regard. Firstly, such a capacity might make us more 
independent, since we won’t always have to ask others to tell us what’s 
right and what’s wrong. Secondly, we might be better-behaved if we have 
such a capacity, since it will enable us to work out how we should behave 
in a given situation, and perhaps that will also mean that we will get in 
trouble less often for doing the wrong thing. Thirdly, those who possess 
this capacity might be smarter and more sophisticated. Fourthly, if we 
have this capacity then others might see us (perhaps rightly) as more 
trustworthy, dependable and accountable, and hence they may be more 
willing to put us in charge of various projects – i.e. they might be more 
prepared to give us our own responsibilities – and that might increase our 
autonomy. But perhaps most importantly, the possession of Williams’ 
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capacity may be thought of as a condition of having a distinctively human 
dignity, because without this capacity we might be less than fully-fledged 
moral agents. These are just some brief reflections – none particularly 
novel – about why we might prefer to be the sorts of people who possess 
Williams’ capacity rather than to lack it. 
And here are some reasons why we may prefer to associate ourselves 
with others who also have Williams’ capacity — and again, I do not take 
any of the points that follow to be particularly novel either. Firstly, we 
might trust those who have this capacity more than we trust those who 
don’t, since we might think that those who do have it are more likely to 
accurately assess their own abilities, and hence that they are therefore also 
more likely to later deliver on their promises. Secondly, we might think 
that people who have this capacity are more dependable, perhaps because 
they are less likely to be distracted away from doing their duty (maybe 
because they can better appreciate the importance of discharging their 
duties) than others who lack this capacity. Thirdly, if this capacity is 
indeed a condition of moral agency, then we might also be more justified 
in expecting those who possess it to do what they ought to do, and that in 
turn might make us feel more secure about interacting with and relying 
upon such people. Fourthly, we might only be justified in holding people 
to account for their actions, for their omissions and for the outcomes of 
their actions and omissions, and to make up for their wrongdoings, if it 
was legitimate for us in the first place to expect them to do those things, 
and that too might make us feel more secure about interacting with such 
people (perhaps because we might feel that if they do mistreat us in some 
way then at least we will have a legitimate claim against them to now 
compensate us for our troubles). Finally, such people’s commitment to the 
cause – i.e. the fact that they will even take on additional responsibilities 
in order to make sure that things go according to plan rather than falling 
apart when someone else neglects their responsibilities – might also make 
them into attractive people to have as partners, as friends, as colleagues 
and as cohorts. In fact, as Williams points out, modern liberal societies 
presuppose a certain system of checks and balances which is only possible 
when the people and organizations that constitute those societies possess 
this capacity. One of the main points of his paper, I take it, was to point 
out that “[r]esponsibility ... is necessary both to sustain [liberalism's 
institutional] order and to address its inevitable failures in achieving all 
that we demand of it” (2008, p. 457). Thus, here again there is a 
conceivably wide range of reasons to prefer to associate ourselves with 
people who possess Williams’ capacity rather than with people who have 
a deficit in this regard. 
There are many reasons to prefer ourselves to be- as well as to 
associate ourselves with people who have Williams’ capacity. People who 
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have that capacity as well as the character traits which Williams associates 
with this virtue are paragons of responsibility, and we have much reason 
to admire them. But the question that needs addressing is not whether we 
should hold this capacity in high regard or admire the people who have it, 
but it is rather whether to be a responsible person in the virtue sense one 
needs to have this capacity, and that is the question to which I now turn. 
 
 
3. What’s wrong with Williams’ suggestion? 
 
Williams asserts that in order for someone to be responsible in the virtue 
sense, they must actually possess the capacity to appropriately respond to 
a variety of normative demands — i.e. he claims that the possession of this 
capacity is a condition of being a responsible person. However, in this 
section I argue for the following two claims: firstly, that we should 
distinguish between two different responsibility concepts that I will call 
virtue responsibility and capacity responsibility; and secondly, that having 
capacity responsibility is not a condition of being virtue responsible. The 
second of these two claims is a denial of Williams’ suggestion, and so if 
this section’s arguments are sound then Williams’ suggestion should be 
rejected. 
 
3.1. DISTINGUISHING CAPACITY RESPONSIBILITY FROM VIRTUE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Consider the following example about my two children, Jane and John: 
Jane is 8 years old and very well behaved. She gets up in the morning 
all by herself, she washes and gets dressed and even makes her own lunch, 
she doesn’t fight with other kids at school, after school she does her 
homework, she cleans up after herself, she helps me make dinner, and she 
even looks out for her older brother John. However, despite the fact that 
Jane is such a responsible little girl, I also know that she is ultimately only 
a little girl – she still lacks the mental capacities that one needs to have in 
order to be a fully responsible person – and so I do not really blame her 
when she sometimes fails to do these things. Jane is a responsible person, 
even though she is not yet a responsible person; or put in a less ambiguous 
way, Jane is a responsible little girl, even though she is not yet a fully 
responsible person. 
Now consider John, Jane’s older brother. John is 17 years old and not 
at all like his much younger sister — some would call John an 
irresponsible young man. He wags school, he won’t make his own lunch 
even though bought lunch is much more expensive, if and when he gets to 
school he always gets in some kind of trouble with the teachers, his 
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bedroom is a pigsty and we are always cleaning up after him in the rest of 
the house; he can not even be trusted to look after his little sister. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that John is an irresponsible young man, we 
all know him well enough to know that he is actually a fully responsible 
person – we’ve seen what he is capable of doing when he puts his mind to 
things – and that is precisely why we are so very dark on him for his 
constant misbehaviour. John is not a responsible person, even though he is 
a responsible person; or put in a less ambiguous way, John is an 
irresponsible young man, even though he is in fact a fully responsible 
person. 
Here are some claims about Jane and John which strike me as 
intuitively plausible — I will use this opportunity to introduce some new 
terminology (italicised), the meaning of which should become apparent 
from its use here and in subsequent paragraphs. Firstly, as regards their 
capacity responsibility, Jane is not yet a fully responsible person but John 
is a fully responsible person. Secondly, as regards their virtue 
responsibility, Jane is a responsible little girl and John is an irresponsible 
young man. Thirdly, as regards their role responsibilities or things that it 
is up to each of them to do, Jane has fewer responsibilities than John, and 
this is at least partly because her capacities are lower than his.3 And 
finally, as regards their outcome responsibility4 or the sorts of things 
                                                        
3 See the discussion towards the end of this sub-section for an important qualification. 
Role responsibility, like virtue responsibility and capacity responsibility, is a term of art; it 
is not my intention to suggest that we only acquire responsibilities through our more formal 
roles like parent, teacher, partner and so on, since I agree wholeheartedly with Williams’ 
plurality claim — i.e. that our responsibilities stem from a possibly wide range of different 
normative sources (see §1 above). Robert Goodin also mentions and employs this kind of 
responsibility concept in his own analysis of responsibility, though he calls it “task 
responsibility” (1987, p. 168). 
4 Outcome responsibility is another term of art, and I take it to be roughly equivalent to 
what Williams’ calls “retrospective responsibility” (Williams, 2008, pp. 457, 459, 460, & 
467). Antony Duff also uses the term “retrospective responsibility” to refer to this 
backwards-looking responsibility concept (Duff 1998). However, there is no agreement on 
what terminology should be used to refer to this concept since others have called it a 
variety of different things. For instance Fischer & Ravizza refer to it as “moral 
responsibility” for actions, for omissions, or for their consequences (1998b), though I am 
not fond of this expression because it still fails to adequately differentiate between our 
forward-looking responsibilities with respect to our actions, omissions and outcomes (our 
“role responsibilities” comprise some of these, though as I argue elsewhere (Vincent, 2006, 
p. 90) we also have other forward-looking responsibilities which I call “liability 
responsibility”) and our backward-looking responsibility for those things (what I have 
called above our “outcome responsibility”). Also, Peter Cane calls this backwards-looking 
responsibility concept “historical responsibility” (2004, p. 162), Thomas Scanlon seems to 
call it “responsibility as attributability” (1998, p. 248), and Christopher Kutz calls a 
component of this backwards-looking responsibility concept “causal responsibility” (2004, 
p. 549). I, however, prefer Stephen Perry’s term “outcome responsibility” (2000, p. 555), 
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(outcomes or more generally states of affairs) for which they can be 
blamed, John can be blamed for more than Jane, and this is at least partly 
because his greater capacities mean that we may justifiably expect more of 
him than we can of her — i.e. John has more and/or greater role 
responsibilities in virtue of his greater capacity responsibility,5 and 
because the scope and degree of his role responsibilities is expanded he 
can therefore be outcome responsible for more things. 
Although my intuitions about these things are not unshakeable or 
indisputable, I do think that they are at least relatively plausible, and 
indeed some of my intuitions in this regard – especially the ones about the 
relationship between capacity responsibility, role responsibility and 
outcome responsibility – are shared in one form or another by others. For 
instance, as regards my claim about the link between outcome 
responsibility and role responsibility, Goodin argues that “different people 
have different [task] responsibilities [my role responsibilities], ex ante, 
because they are allocated different duties and tasks. And people bear 
differential ex post responsibilities for outcomes, on this account, 
depending on the role that they played or should have played, pursuant to 
those ex ante task-responsibilities, in producing or averting those 
outcomes” (1987, p. 179, original emphasis). Secondly, as regards my 
claim about the link between role responsibility and capacity 
responsibility, Goodin writes: “I shall say little about the bases upon 
which these task-responsibilities [my role responsibilities] get assigned to 
the particular people they do. No doubt part of the story – no doubt a large 
part of it – has to do with people's differential capacities for performing 
the tasks and duties at issue” (1987, p. 180, emphasis added). The picture 
painted by Fischer and Ravizza also suggests that similar relations obtain 
between these responsibility concepts; for instance, while talking about the 
responsibility of young children, they argue that their “gradually 
expanding range of responsiveness [to reasons — i.e. my capacity 
responsibility] indicates the class of actions for which the child is properly 
held accountable” (1998b, p. 80), which is an expression of the same sort 
of relationship between capacity responsibility and outcome responsibility 
that I endorsed above. And in an earlier discussion of their “tracing 
approach,” Fischer and Ravizza point out that the reason why capacity 
responsibility matters to outcome responsibility is because someone with 
adequate capacity “can reasonably be expected to have known” how they 
ought to have behaved — i.e. that capacity responsibility bears on role 
responsibilities (1998b, p. 50, they develop these ideas further in Chapters 
4 and 5). In any case, in the discussion that follows I will treat these 
                                                                                                                              
since it cleanly captures the idea of a form of responsibility which looks backwards in time 
towards states of affairs (outcomes) that were brought about. 
5 See the discussion at the end of this sub-section for an important qualification. 
118                                                Nicole A Vincent                                           
 
intuitions about the different kinds of responsibility claims that can be 
made about Jane and John, and about the relations which obtain between 
these different responsibility concepts, as veridical. 
The first thing which I hope to highlight with the Jane and John 
example and the related intuitions and discussion is that it is one thing to 
talk about whether someone is a responsible or an irresponsible person in 
the virtue sense of the term “responsibility” (i.e. what I call “virtue 
responsibility”), and that it is quite another thing to talk about whether 
they are fully responsible or not fully responsible in the capacity sense of 
the term “responsibility” (i.e. what I call “capacity responsibility”). As 
regards their virtue responsibility, Jane can be praised for the fact that she 
is such a responsible little girl, and John can be criticized for the fact that 
he is such an irresponsible young man; but as regards their capacity 
responsibility, something quite the opposite is the case — the right thing 
to say about Jane is that she is not yet a fully responsible person, and the 
right thing to say about John is that he is a fully responsible person. Thus, 
saying that someone is a virtue responsible person need not yet tell us 
anything about whether they are capacity responsible (think of Jane), and 
saying that they are a capacity responsible person need not yet tell us 
anything about whether they are virtue responsible (think of John). 
If capacity responsibility and virtue responsibility were the same 
concepts, then whenever we assess a person we should find that our 
judgments about their capacity responsibility and their virtue 
responsibility coincide. However, as the intuitions in the Jane and John 
example demonstrate, our judgments about capacity responsibility and 
virtue responsibility can come apart — Jane is a (virtue) responsible little 
girl even though she is not yet a (capacity) responsible person, and despite 
the fact that John is a fully (capacity) responsible person he is nevertheless 
an (virtue) irresponsible young man. Although a paragon of responsibility 
might be both capacity responsible and virtue responsible at the same time 
– i.e. they might possess Williams’ capacity as well as have a consistent 
history that testifies to their admirable character traits – and there might 
also be others who lack Williams’ capacity as well as having a consistent 
history of bad behaviour, there is no reason to suppose that capacity 
responsibility and virtue responsibility must always coincide like that. I 
take the fact that our judgments about capacity responsibility and virtue 
responsibility can come apart like this to entail that capacity responsibility 
and virtue responsibility must be different responsibility concepts. 
The second thing which I think this example and the related intuitions 
show, is that claims about capacity responsibility can play a very different 
functional role in our thinking about what other responsibility claims can 
be made about that person, than claims about their virtue responsibility. 
On the one hand, claims about a person’s capacity responsibility might 
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affect the sorts of things for which we can blame that person – i.e. they 
might affect our judgments about the things for which they are outcome 
responsible – and as I suggested above with support from Goodin’s as well 
as Fischer and Ravizza’s analyses, they do this by affecting our 
judgements about that person’s role responsibilities. The thought here is 
that we can only legitimately blame someone for doing something bad if it 
was reasonable to expect them not to do it in the first place – for instance, 
if they had the capacity to realize that they shouldn’t have done that – but 
since we can only legitimately expect people to do things which they can 
actually do (though see the discussion almost immediately below for an 
important qualification), capacity responsibility is therefore a condition of 
outcome responsibility in the sense that a lack of capacity responsibility 
can reduce the extent of a person’s blame or outcome responsibility. Put 
another way, people can be excused for doing certain things when the 
reason why they did those things is because they lacked the capacity to not 
do them and they were not responsible for this reduced capacity – e.g. 
because due to their young age they lacked the capacity to realize that they 
shouldn’t have been doing that – and so claims about capacity 
responsibility can under the right circumstances perform an excusing role 
in our judgments about blame and outcome responsibility. 
On the other hand, claims about a person’s virtue responsibility do not 
play an excusing role, although they can give us reasons to forgive 
someone for something bad that they have done and perhaps even to 
reduce their punishment or whatever other harsh treatment we think is 
appropriate given what they did. For instance, if John had previously been 
a model citizen and this was the only thing that he had ever done wrong, 
then his one slip might perhaps be forgiven — he would still be outcome 
responsible and blameworthy for what he did, though we may decide to let 
him off on this occasion since everyone is entitled to a few slip-ups here 
and there. But given that claims about capacity responsibility play a very 
different role to claims about virtue responsibility – i.e. claims about a 
person’s capacity responsibility can play an excusing role, whereas claims 
about a person’s virtue responsibility may only affect whether we forgive 
them for what they have done – that is therefore another reason to suppose 
that these are in fact two very different responsibility concepts. 
Before drawing my intended conclusion though, that capacity 
responsibility and virtue responsibility are two different responsibility 
concepts, I must first address two worries: the first relates to an important 
qualification of the claim that role responsibilities depend on capacity 
responsibility, and the second has to do with what we might legitimately 
be entitled to say of someone who seemingly lacks the capacity to stop 
making wounding remarks (however caused — e.g. by an old head injury) 
and others like them. On the first point, my suggestion that role 
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responsibilities depend on capacity responsibility should not be 
misunderstood as the claim that our role responsibilities are determined by 
our capacity responsibility, since for instance if someone is responsible for 
the fact that they now have some incapacity, then that incapacity can not 
be cited by them to divest themselves of their responsibilities and thus to 
avoid blame for having done whatever it was that they did. Fischer and 
Ravizza comment on this in the context of discussing their “tracing 
approach” according to which “when an agent is morally responsible for 
an action that issues from a mechanism that is not appropriately reasons-
responsive, we must be able to trace back along the history of the action to 
a point (suitably related to the action) where there was indeed an 
appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism” (1998a, pp. 50-51, original 
emphasis). In other words, on their account if someone is responsible for 
the fact that the mechanism from which their actions stem is not reasons 
responsive, then the fact that their actions were produced by a mechanism 
that is not reasons-responsive would not exculpate them of their 
responsibility. However, although the fact that certain histories – namely, 
those in which the agent is outcome responsible for their own reduced 
capacity responsibility – prevent us from citing certain incapacities as 
exculpatory factors, this does not pose a problem for the point which I am 
presently advancing, since my point is not that reduced capacity always 
necessarily excuses the incapacitated person (such a claim would be 
patently false, for instance, in cases where the person is outcome 
responsible for their own reduced capacity responsibility), but it is rather 
that while considerations of reduced capacity can provide excuses, claims 
about a person’s virtue responsibility can not play this role. This is an 
important part of the reason why I do not claim that our role 
responsibilities are determined by our capacity responsibility but rather 
why I only claim that there is some kind of a dependence relationship 
between them.6 
On the second point, I do not intend any of what I said above to entail 
that someone who seemingly lacks the capacity to stop making wounding 
remarks can not be criticized as “nasty” or “spiteful” or whatever else 
might seem appropriate, even if the reason why they are like this is (for 
instance) because of an old head injury for which they were not 
responsible. On my account such criticisms may be perfectly fitting, 
however they will only be such as long as those criticisms are intended as 
criticisms of their character — i.e. as statements about their lack of virtue 
responsibility. However, on my account such criticisms would be 
inappropriate if they were intended as attributions of outcome 
                                                        
6 I discuss these and related points in detail elsewhere (Vincent, 2006, pp. 87-123; 
Vincent, 2008, p. 202). 
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responsibility or blame to the person concerned, and the reason why I 
think that this would be inappropriate is precisely because a person whose 
capacity responsibility is reduced might not satisfy the requirements for 
being a legitimate target for attributions of blame and outcome 
responsibility for their actions, omissions and for the consequences of 
their outcomes and omissions (on the proviso that they are not responsible 
for their reduced capacity responsibility). And far from this being a 
lamentable feature of my account of the relations between the different 
kinds of responsibility concepts that were listed above – most importantly 
for the present discussion, of the relationships between capacity-, role- and 
outcome responsibility – I take this to be a virtue of that account since it 
allows us to say the intuitively correct thing about whether such a person 
can be criticized as nasty, spiteful or whatever else (yes, they can be 
criticized for the sort of person that they are), but at the same time it also 
respects the intuition that such a person may fail to be a legitimate target 
for attributions of blame and outcome responsibility for the things that 
they do. 
Thus, in summary, there are two reasons to suppose that capacity 
responsibility and virtue responsibility are two different responsibility 
concepts: firstly, our judgments about a person’s capacity responsibility 
and their virtue responsibility can come apart; and secondly, while claims 
about a person’s capacity responsibility can perform an excusing function, 
claims about their virtue responsibility can only play a forgiving role. 
 
3.2. CAPACITY RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT A CONDITION OF VIRTUE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
So far I have argued that capacity responsibility and virtue responsibility 
are two different responsibility concepts. However, that does not yet show 
that Williams’ claim that the capacity to respond to a plurality of 
normative demands – undoubtedly an important component of capacity 
responsibility – is not a condition of being a virtue responsible person. The 
mere fact that capacity responsibility and virtue responsibility are two 
distinct concepts is not yet a reason to suppose that those concepts might 
not be related to each other in some way — for instance, Williams might 
accept what I have said about these being two different responsibility 
concepts, but yet he might still nevertheless claim that being responsible in 
one sense (i.e. capacity responsible) is a condition of being responsible in 
the other sense (i.e. virtue responsible). Nevertheless, I will now argue that 
no such relationship between capacity responsibility and virtue 
responsibility obtains. 
The claim that capacity responsibility is a condition of virtue 
responsibility is ambiguous; it might mean either (i) that capacity 
122                                                Nicole A Vincent                                           
 
responsibility is a necessary condition of virtue responsibility, or (ii) that 
capacity responsibility is a sufficient condition of virtue responsibility, or 
even (iii) that capacity responsibility is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of virtue responsibility.7 However, given the Jane and John 
example and the related intuitions, I do not think that any of these claims 
can be sustained. 
Firstly, might capacity responsibility be a necessary condition of virtue 
responsibility? Not if we want to retain the intuition that Jane is a 
responsible little girl — something which I take to be an example of a 
claim about her virtue responsibility. If capacity responsibility were a 
necessary condition of virtue responsibility, then since Jane lacks capacity 
responsibility – after all, she is still only a little girl and she has not yet 
developed the capacities of a fully mature adult8 – she therefore could not 
be said to be a virtue responsible person. Furthermore, if capacity 
responsibility were a necessary condition of virtue responsibility, then in 
light of the fact that Jane is a virtue responsible little girl we would also 
have to conclude that she is a capacity responsible person — if capacity 
responsibility were a necessary condition of virtue responsibility, then a 
virtue responsible person would have to be capacity responsible. But if 
that were so (i.e. if Jane was capacity responsible) then since capacity 
responsibility is also a condition of outcome responsibility, we would 
therefore have to conclude that Jane should not be excused when her 
behaviour fails to come up to her usual high standards. However, Jane’s 
early age and the associated deficit of capacity is precisely the sort of 
consideration that would normally be taken into consideration when we 
determine whether someone is to blame/outcome responsible for their bad 
behaviour, or whether they should be excused for it.9 Thus, if we wish to 
retain the intuition that Jane is a responsible little girl, and if we do not 
wish to be forced to say that she is fully outcome responsible for the things 
that she does – or at least if we want to leave open the possibility that her 
outcome responsibility may sometimes be reduced on account of her 
young age and thus her reduced capacities – then we’d better not insist 
that capacity responsibility is a necessary condition of virtue 
responsibility. 
                                                        
7 I do not mean to imply that Williams thinks that capacity responsibility is a 
sufficient condition of virtue responsibility, but I do think that this is one possible 
interpretation of the claim that capacity responsibility is a condition of virtue 
responsibility, and so for this reason I consider it here along with the other two 
interpretations of the claim that capacity responsibility is a condition of virtue 
responsibility. 
8 I stipulate this as part of my example; for instance, she is not a precocious 
developer or anything of that sort. 
9 Though please note my qualifications towards the end of §3.1. above. 
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Secondly, might capacity responsibility be a sufficient condition of 
virtue responsibility? Not if we want to retain the intuition that John is an 
irresponsible young man — this too is an instance of a claim which I take 
to be an example of a claim about someone’s virtue responsibility. If 
capacity responsibility were a sufficient condition of virtue responsibility, 
then since John is fully responsible in the capacity responsibility sense – 
this is again something which I stipulate as part of my example – he 
therefore should be fully responsible in the virtue sense too. However, 
John is patently irresponsible – he is anything but an example of a virtue 
responsible person – and so for this reason I urge that we should not 
suppose that capacity responsibility is a sufficient condition of virtue 
responsibility. 
Finally, might capacity responsibility be a necessary and sufficient 
condition of virtue responsibility? Apart from everything else that was 
already said above, a further reason why we should reject the suggestion 
that capacity responsibility is a necessary and sufficient condition of virtue 
responsibility is because by saying this we would have to deny that 
irresponsible people (i.e. those who, like John, are not virtue responsible) 
can ever be blamed for what they do (i.e. that they can be outcome 
responsible). If capacity responsibility were both necessary and sufficient 
for virtue responsibility, then claims about a person’s capacity 
responsibility would track claims about their virtue responsibility — for 
instance, if we said that John is irresponsible then this would entail that he 
must therefore lack capacity responsibility. However, as I said earlier, 
claims about a person’s diminished capacity responsibility can also 
perform an excusing function — i.e. the fact that someone lacks capacity 
responsibility can under the right circumstances (if they are not 
responsible for this state of affairs) be cited as a legitimate reason to (at 
least partially) excuse them of their outcome responsibility. But if claims 
about a person’s irresponsibility entailed that they must lack capacity 
responsibility, and claims about diminished capacity responsibility 
reduced the extent of their blame or outcome responsibility, then by 
transitivity claims about a person’s irresponsibility might end up excusing 
them for the bad things that they do!10 But if anything, the fact that John is 
an irresponsible young man is a reason to hold him in even lower regard 
rather than it being a reason to excuse him for the bad things that he does, 
and so for this reason I do not think that capacity responsibility is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of virtue responsibility. 
                                                        
10 Heidi Maibom has recently run this kind of argument in the context of 
discussing the responsibility of psychopaths (Maibom, 2008). In essence, her claim 
seems to be that psychopaths should not be excused for the bad things that they do just 
because they are bad, since a claim like “I couldn’t help killing them — after all I’m 
bad” is not a legitimate excuse. 
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Capacity responsibility is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, nor a 
necessary and sufficient condition of virtue responsibility, and so 
Williams’ suggestion that to be virtue responsible one must also be 
capacity responsible should be rejected. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Linguistic conventions are just that – i.e. conventions – and we could 
conceivably decide that we are only prepared to give the accolade “a 
responsible person” (an instance of praising a person for how responsible 
they are in the virtue sense) to someone who actually possesses Williams’ 
capacities as well as an earnest willingness to do the right thing and a 
history that testifies to that willingness. Put another way, we could simply 
stipulate that for someone to have “responsibility as a virtue” they must 
have both my capacity responsibility and my virtue responsibility. 
However, after briefly explaining in §2 of this essay why this 
suggestion might sound attractive, in §3 I argued that doing this would be 
unwise because there is an important distinction to be drawn here which 
would unfortunately be obscured by doing this. Among the various 
responsibility concepts which populate debates about responsibility there 
are two similar-sounding but ultimately very different responsibility 
concepts — i.e. virtue responsibility and capacity responsibility. The 
distinction between these concepts is visible once we realize that claims 
about capacity responsibility and virtue responsibility can come apart, and 
also when we notice that each of these two kinds of claims plays a very 
different functional role in justifying further claims about responsibility. 
Furthermore, I also argued that there are good reasons to suppose that 
having one kind of responsibility (i.e. capacity responsibility) is not any 
kind of a condition of being responsible in the other sense (i.e. virtue 
responsible). Thus, if we really wish for some term that will allow us to 
refer to people who are both virtue- and capacity responsible, then my 
suggestion is that we should call such people “paragons of responsibility.” 
Our language must make it possible to criticize someone for the fact 
that they are irresponsible (that they lack virtue responsibility) but at the 
same time to also attribute responsibility to them for the things that they 
do (on account that they possess capacity responsibility), or to praise 
someone for the fact that they are so responsible (that they possess virtue 
responsibility) but without this necessarily having to entail that they are 
legitimate targets for attributions of responsibility for the things that they 
do (since they may lack capacity responsibility). Put another way, our 
language must make it possible to criticize someone’s character without 
this entailing that they are not responsible moral agents, and it must allow 
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us to praise someone’s character without this entailing that they are 
responsible moral agents. However, these things can only be done if we 
clearly distinguish the concepts of capacity responsibility and virtue 
responsibility rather than blurring their boundaries as Williams does. 
Thus, I now conclude that, pace Williams, to be virtue-responsible a 
person needs only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have 
a history which testifies to that willingness, but that they need not actually 
possess Williams’ capacity. 
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